Two Whiffs of Air: *A Critical Essay*

Frits Staal

Abstract: When John Chamberlain and other missionaries arrived in India in 1803, the first steps were taken toward the creation of a new religion in due course called Hinduism. This new religion was a form of Vaishnavism, projected into a Vedic past and accepted by Indian nationalists as well as Sanskrit scholars such as R.G. Bhandarkar and M. Monier Williams.

Hermeneutics started with Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias and addressed logicians, philosophers, and students of language after which it lost its precise meaning. Louis Renou, the foremost Sanskritist of the twentieth century, revived its use to characterise a theory of metarule, a rule about rules, which flourished among ritualists and grammarians beginning with the Ritual Sūtras of the Late Vedic Period.

> And when concepts are lacking,
> a word appears in the very nick of time
> (*Und wo Begriffe fehlen,*
> *da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein*)
>
> Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust*

Introduction

Some of the sounds of language are produced when air – *prāṇa* – flows from the lungs spontaneously into the vocal tract. One of them used to be called a voiced fricative and is now generally referred to as a glide. In English, it is represented by 'h' and occurs at the beginning of syllables as in 'hairy' or 'behave'. In Sanskrit, a similar glide is called *visarjanīya* or *visarga*. It is represented in Roman transliteration as an 'h' with a dot underneath and occurs at the end of syllables as in *Agniḥ* or *Śunaḥśepaḥ*, 'Dog-tailed', the name of a Vedic seer.

Let me confess at the outset that I have always disliked these aches. Psychoanalyst friends tell me it is due to the 'h' that some people put in my name. For I am not only 'Frits' and not 'Fritz', but also 'Staal' and not 'Stahl'. Since names are arbitrary, these 'scientists' interpret my message as: 'I am Dutch and not German'.

The idea that 'h' does not occur in my name might have influenced me deeply but I cannot know about it by definition and believe that such interpretations prove nothing. There must be more objective reasons. Why, for example, are there so many bad H's around, culminating in Hitler and including many European thinkers? It starts with Heraclitus who declared: 'in the same rivers we step and

step not, we are and are not' (Diels Fragment #49a). Taken at face value (which language must be taken at by definition as we shall see later), the first clause is a contradiction, the second clause another, and if the entire fragment were intended to be an inference it would not be a valid one.

We might interpret Heraclitus' declaration in more generous terms. Among the Pre-Socratics, Democritus would soon be able to substantiate them. In that case, Heraclitus might have meant: if we step twice in the same river, it is not the same river because it consists of different particles at each step. It would not be a very persuasive alternative because not only rivers consist of different particles at different points in place and time, but so do oceans and many other ponds and pools of water. In a similar manner, deserts are sometimes said to consist of sand. A river is a river because it flows down from mountains, starting from a source and often ending in a delta or larger mass of water unless it dries up in the desert as did the Oxus and the Sarasvatī. The fact that a river is more than water would be explained later by Plato's Theory of Ideas which is the Greek counterpart to the philosophy of language of the Indian Grammarians and the Mīmāṃsā as Murti (1963) has explained.

I have taken some time on Heraclitus but similar logical and factual mistakes abound in Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, if we stick to the big names. India has, apart from Hindu Philosophy, the philosophy of the Hīnayāna, 'The Abandoned Vehicle', but that is merely a pejorative for the name Theravāda, 'Doctrine of the Elders'. It is due to the Mahāyāna which calls itself 'The Great Vehicle'. Someone may take the time to write a book about these whiffy names.

The courageous author who would be ready to do so should not claim that all the big H's are wrong from beginning to end. Nor are they always easily refuted. Heidegger's philosophy is not inconsistent because he was a fascist. Plotinus had noted already that bad people fetch water from the rivers. But one should be very careful since most of the great H's were not stupid and some of them made new discoveries. The one interesting statement that I found in all of the Heidegger I know (which includes *Holzwege* which end in the forest), occurs at the end of the Introduction (#7) to *Sein und Zeit*. It reflects a significant observation though it misses the boat. Heidegger writes there that it is different to provide a narration about beings (*Seiendes*) and to capture beings in their Being (*Sein*). The reason is given in the next sentence which I translate as follows: 'For that purpose, what is lacking is not only *words* but above all *grammar*' (*Dazu fehlen nicht nur die Worte, sondern vor allem die 'Grammatik'*). What Heidegger fails to see here is that such grammars existed in India at least since Pāṇini and that similar algebraic systems existed in Europe at least since Euler and in the Arab countries probably earlier. Algebraic systems led to the artificial languages without which modern science and modern world views would not exist.

Hinduism

It has long been known that the notions of 'Hinduism' and 'Hindu religion' came into being when foreign visitors, including missionaries and colonial

administrators, asked the natives: 'what is your religion?' The answers, given in numerous languages, mentioned 'Hindu' which is the same as 'Indian' and comes from the name of the river Sindhu or Indus. Indians, in other words, unfamiliar as they were with the concept of religion, simply answered: 'I am an Indian'. Thus, a religion was born.

It may be a story but there is more to it in any case. Drawing special attention to the role of Ram Mohan Roy, Heesterman described in 1989 how the name and concept of 'Hinduism' were projects of the British Raj and its counterpart: the various forms of Indian nationalism. In a similar spirit, Lorenzen wrote an article with the title 'Who invented Hinduism?' It was published in 1999.

By that time, the argument had already been settled. The details were authoritatively covered in all desirable detail by Dalmia (1997) in her book, *The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bhāratendu Hariśchandra and Nineteenth-century Banaras.*

Dalmia's book should be a required reading for anyone who is seriously interested in 'Hinduism'. For readers who have not already done so, I shall provide here two groups of summaries and excerpts, the first from chap. 4 ('Hindi as the National Language of the Hindus') and the second from chap. 6 ('The Only Real Religion of the Hindus').

Hindi as the national language of the Hindus

The beginning of Dalmia's section, *Addressing the Hindus in Hinduī: Missionary Tracts and School Books* (pp. 169–71), describes how the first effective steps were taken by a missionary called John Chamberlain who arrived in Śrīrāmpur in 1803. By 1811, he had looked around enough and decided on a course of action. He wrote about his plans to Dr. Ryland, Principal of the Bristol Academy:

> The language called by Europeans "Hindoost'hanee" and the language of the Hindus are diverse. The latter is "Hinduwee". The "Hindoost'hanee" which is spoken by Mussulmans is a compound of Hinduwee, Persic, and Arabic; it is much spoken as a popular tongue, and is used in all civil and military proceedings; but I suspect that if we would do good to the major part of the Hindoos, we must have the Scriptures (i.e., Christianity: *FS*) in their own vernacular language, and must preach to them in that language too.

A few years later, Chamberlain discovered more in Patna and *Hinduism* was beginning to come into its own:

> The Mussulmans in these parts seem to be few to the Hindoos. In Patna, there is a good proportion. The language of the people is different from what I expected to find it. The Brahmans speak "Sunskrita Hindostani" and appear to despise the Scriptures on account of their containing so many Mussulman words.

The activities of Cunningham and his co-religionists, including men like J.T. Thomson and M.T. Adam, were chiefly concerned with language and religion. This contributed to the creation of the modern Hindi language and to a new religion, 'Hinduism', to be clearly distinguished from both Christianity and Islam. My final quotes occur on p. 171:

> The North India Tract and Book Society ... printed 178,350 copies of tracts till 1868. The American Presbyterian Mission printed 350,700 copies of Hindi Tracts and Books. The Bombay and Ludhiana presses, as also the one in Tirhut, were also engaged in publishing Hindi tracts.
>
> While most of the tracts are, in fact, translations from English, Sanskrit, Bengali, and Urdu and show traces of these languages, those composed after 1823 seem to be fast approaching the standard of modern Hindi. Since they are exclusively addressed to Hindus, and it is the Hindu religion (which is variously termed Hindū mat, Hindū dharma) which has to be discussed in order to persuade the readership to ultimately discard it, only expressly Hindu terminology is used.

> Dalmia concludes: 'The Hindu religion is being seen as a single religion and it is as such that it is then further sought to be undermined'.

The only real religion of the Hindus

The sixth and the final chapter of Dalmia's book returns to some of the basic ideas of Hariścandra. According to him, the centre of the Hindu dharma was the Vaiṣṇava tradition and the increasing emphasis on *bhakti* or 'loving devotion'. That latter notion transcends the traditions of knowledge (*jñāna*) and ritual (*karma*) that developed in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. I formulate Dalmia's thesis in the terminology and perspective of the Bhagavad Gītā (BG) which is part of the epic and not, of course, of 'Hinduism'. I have used these three key terms in a similar effort at clarification in Staal (2008) because they are widely known. The term *bhakti*, in particular, throws light on the terms and concepts of 'Vaiṣṇavism' and 'religion'.

What did the BG itself have to say about them? Kṛṣṇa is directly addressed as Viṣṇu in BG 2.24 and 30. According to Bhandarkar (1913:13), the two deities were identified soon afterwards. According to Edgerton (1952:30–3), Viṣṇu belongs to the prehistory of Kṛṣṇa. In his new translation (2008:xliii–iv), George Thompson notes that Kṛṣṇa is occasionally referred to by epithets that are also used to refer to Viṣṇu in other parts of the Mahābhārata (and other sources), but only once to Viṣṇu himself. Thompson himself has no compunction in assigning the BG to 'Hindu literature' and 'Hindu traditions' but notes that these attributions are rare.

Dalmia expands the topic as it developed in the nineteenth century on p. 396:

> 'It was left to Monier Williams to piece together the evidence being offered by individual scholars into a grand narrative of the Vaiṣṇava religion as a

continuum which stretched from the Vedas into the present and which claimed
to be historically sound, authorised as it was by a fully fledged philologist, with
the knowledge and insights into the various strata of textual tradition.'

It would be hard to find support for such a narrative in the Vedas but the Hare
Krishnas tried it again in the Euro-Americas and with obvious success.

The next steps were taken jointly by Monier Williams and George A. Grierson,
the formidable compiler and editor of *The Linguistic Survey of India* (1903–28),
who in his younger years had dabbled in more speculative matters. Both men
agreed that the Syrian Nestorian Christians of the South, who had maintained a
flourishing community in India from the third century onward, had been the main
source of influence in the formation of the concept of *bhakti* (p. 401).

Dalmia describes in the rest of her chapters how these views were eagerly
accepted not only by Indian nationalists but also by Sanskrit scholars such as
R.G. Bhandarkar. According to the latter, Vaiṣṇavism was a true religion although
Śiva was always vulnerable and transgressive: 'Śaivism in its more Brahmanical
impress was merely philosophical, which in the parlance of the day, meant a denial
of its status as a "real religion". In its ritual aspect, it could not be viewed other
than as a degenerate practice' (p. 408).

The rest of the story is predictable and I leave it to the reader. It is obvious that
missionaries entered the fray. They provided accounts of Śaiva and Tantric rites
that, according to them, had never existed in the truly Indian religion of 'Hindu-
ism'. Dalmia adds that the propagation and ideologisation of *bhakti* were eagerly
accepted by Indian nationalists and not confined to 'western Indology' as Krishna
Sharma in 1987 had claimed (pp. 409–10).

Hermeneutics

The case of hermeneutics is different from that of Hinduism. The latter illustrates
the process of Sanskritization, a term and concept introduced by Srinivas in
anthropology in 1952 and placed in a wider perspective by Staal (1963a). Hinduism
did not exist before the nineteenth century. Hermeneutics existed more than two
millennia earlier but in ancient Greece and in a totally different form.

We can only understand modern hermeneutics if we know the history of the term
which started with Aristotle who composed, probably in his youth, a small booklet
called (in Greek) *Peri Hermeneias* or 'On Interpretation'. This English phrase is one of
many translations of the Latin version *De Interpretatione* which was studied through-
out the European middle ages and deserves to be studied for as long as I can foresee by
logicians, philosophers, and students of language. Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias* resem-
bles in that respect the *Paspaśa* or 'Introduction' to Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* or 'Great
Commentary' on Pāṇini's Sanskrit grammar which addresses the same audience.

The two works are very different in other respects. Patañjali's *Paspaśa* is well
written and not without humour; it is not only fully intelligible to students of

Pāṇini but also repletes with attractive stories, for example about Bṛhaspati, the professor of Indra. Aristotle is systematic, clear, and concise, more like Pāṇini himself but not so perfect. His sentences are transparent to modern readers because he formulated for the first time what is now widely understood by educated Euro-Americans because of his work.

Since Aristotle proceeded in a rational manner, like Pāṇini and Patañjali, he was in a position to make mistakes. There are two in the *De Interpretatione* according to leading historians of logic (e.g., Kneale and Kneale 1962:54). One of them was discussed for more than two millennia. Other historians found other errors, one described as 'a disaster, comparable only to the Fall of Adam' (Geach 1972: 47).

Both the *De Interpretatione* and the *Paspaśa* are brief and available in excellent English translations (Ackrill 1963) or paraphrases (Chatterji 1957). This stuff is not easy but young people get smarter every minute. I recommend that instead of wasting time on gadgets or business administration, they should study these works in high school. They are the roots of IT and gamy.

I am not assuming that such basic expository works were only composed in Greek and Sanskrit. That China has produced them is clear from Christoph Harbsmeier's volume on 'Language and Logic' which is vol. 7, Part I of Joseph Needham's series *Science and Civilization in China* published unlike Aristotle not in Oxford but in Cambridge. References to introductory works occur on many of the 479 pages of Harbsmeier's book and some might appeal to logicians, philosophers, students of language, and high school students.

The more recent periods of the history of hermeneutics in Europe show a steady decline. I have described some of its salient features first in 1967, then in a wider context in Staal (1988, 1990) (pp. 28–31 and chap. 29), and hope to be excused from expatiating further on this depressing topic. I should, not fail, however, to comment briefly on the new characterisation of the topic of hermeneutics by the Managing Editor of the present issue, Jessica Frazier, which reads as follows:

> The Critical Connection theme for 2008 is "Hermeneutics". Hermeneutics is the science of discovering new meanings and interpretations in "all those situations in which we encounter meanings that are not immediately understandable but require interpretive effort" (Gadamer 1976:xii). Hindu culture adopts and demands an array of approaches to interpretation of its many types of "text". Hermeneutic practice raises a range of questions over issues such as the social context and implicit power of hermeneutic rules, the inter-weaving of different traditions and methods in interpretive practice, the position of the observer in respect to both created and lived Hindu "texts", the application of contemporary hermeneutic theory to Indian culture, and the history of its different discourses (linguistic, visual, social, etc.).

Any characterisation of the science of hermeneutics can only be evaluated in terms of its primary subject, viz., language. Opinions on this topic vary but there is some kind of rough agreement among linguists that human language consists

of at least three basic domains that I shall refer to as Phonetic/Phonology, Syntax, and Semantics. The first deals with sounds, the second with structure, and the third with meaning. How are these three domains related?

One may start from either end or from the middle. Since we are interested in interpretation, I shall start with semantics. One section of semantics deals with the meaning of words. They are provided, ideally for each language, by a lexicon. Syntax deals with larger units: sentences, paragraphs, etc. Syntax and Semantics must accordingly join hands to assign meanings to these larger units. It would be fine with me to call the result the 'science of hermeneutics'. But we have to ask and answer several questions. All the issues listed by Frazier deal with interesting problems but what do they have in common that may enable us to relate them to a single discipline? What else is needed and what other disciplines are at hand already?

Gadamer's quote is, at best, acceptable but it is not clear. What, for instance, does he mean by 'immediately'? To understand Aristotle may take more time than to understand Gore Vidal but it sheds little light on any 'interpretative effort' since 'hermeneutics' is already an 'interpretation'. Though it is not as outlandish as the examples I gave in Staal 1988/90 (p. 31), the quote from Gadamer does not clarify anything. It is so nebulous that one cannot even find a mistake. Putting all of it together, we can arrive at only one conclusion: though his name does not start with H, Gadamer cannot be taken seriously.

Frazier's list refers to many problems that have been discussed elsewhere. 'Implicit power' is reminiscent of H.P. Grice's 'implicatures'. 'Texts' are typically encountered by philologists who study the three monotheistic traditions that originated in Western Asia. The notion of 'text', however, is practically absent in India's history which started with Oral Traditions and continued to be dominated by them throughout the early periods – a striking difference with the Near East, China and the Euro-Americas. 'The position of the observer' certainly raises interesting questions but these have been studied by social scientists for over a century. Historical dimensions are not missing – see, e.g., *Journal of Historical Pragmatics*. One could go on in similar veins but I do not see any justification for a new discipline that carries the name of Hermeneutics and deserves to be the heir to Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias*.

Louis Renou on herméneutique

I know of one precise and meaningful use of the term hermeneutics in a Sanskrit context. It was introduced by Louis Renou, the foremost Sanskritist of the twentieth century. Gerow (1968) characterised Renou's own studies of the Veda as 'exegetical', a felicitous expression. But it was not used, and neither was 'hermeneutical' in that context, as far as I have been able to find out, by Charles Malamoud, Renou's most prominent French pupil, or by Derrida in his essay on Malamoud of 2002.

Renou used the term *herméneutique* to refer to the Sanskrit *pāribhāṣika* in his study on the connections between ritual and grammar in Sanskrit (Renou 1941–42). He found 'a truly grammatical scholastics underlying a ritualistic hermeneutics

(look at the french)' (*il y a là une véritable scolastique grammaticale sous-jacente à l'herméneutique ritualiste*).

Sanskrit *pāribhāṣika* is derived from *paribhāṣā,* which literally means 'speaking about'. The concept arose in the Vedic Śrauta ritual and was developed among Sanskrit grammarians and elsewhere. In 1962, the term 'metalanguage' was introduced in the study of Indian logic and grammar, simultaneously by Hartmut Scharfe and myself but independent of each other. That was an auspicious beginning and established that *paribhāṣā* corresponds to 'metarule' or 'rule about a rule' – a technical term that had come in more general use through the work of the Polish-American logician Alfred Tarski.

The stage was now set and Renou published in 1963 his magisterial survey on the underlying notion: Sanskrit *sūtra* or 'rule'. He filled in the gaps as a matter of course but went much further. *Sūtras* had been used and studied for two and a half millennia in India but no one had arrived at a similar overview of the entire system. Since Renou's French, itself sometimes expressed in *sūtra*-ic style, had remained unknown to many, I was happy when Vatsyayan asked me to write about the topic in 1992. I made ample use of Renou and hope that it will be read by modern scientists in India and elsewhere for those who are familiar with formulas cannot fail to note that the concept of *sūtra* corresponds to them in many respects – though it was not used by Indian mathematicians after the Vedic period.

A rule about rules must make use of a device found in some languages that is called 'quoting'. Following in the footsteps of Aristotle, Tarski had explained that language and reality are related by statements such as:

> 'Snow is white' is true if, and only if, snow is white.

This is easier to express in a written language but in classical Sanskrit, spoken as well as written, use is made of the quoting particle *iti*. It marks the end, though not the beginning of a quotation. It may be represented in written English by the opening quotation mark " as in the following example from the *Śrauta Sūtras*, where the *paribhāṣā* or metarule is put between single quotes but the missing *beginning* quote of the rules that are quoted is supplied. The rules to which the metarules refer are therefore placed between double quotes. The context is the depositing of bricks on each layer of the Agnicayana altar as described by Staal, Vaidikan, and Itti Ravi in 1983:

> 'Rules like "he deposits it toward the east, he deposits it toward the west" imply "the celebrating agent faces in that direction" ' (*prācīm upadadhāti pratīcīm upadadhātīti kartur mukhāvadaḥ*: Staal 2004:538).

Scharfe's (1961) German book *Die Logik im Mahābhāṣya* had depicted Patañjali as a rather primitive logician. I claimed in my 1963 review that Patañjali could be compared to no less a thinker than Aristotle. It caught again the eye of Renou in one of his last articles (1969:498).

The end of hermeneutics

Hermeneutics in its more recent developments is less than two centuries old. One might say: it is like a rare cactus and should be preserved. But hermeneutics contains the seeds of its destruction in itself. You cannot say, dear reader, as is done in Gadamerian hermeneutics: 'in propositions, the meaning horizon of what is exactly to be said is concealed with systematic exactitude'. Hermeneutics is about meaning, and meaning expressed by humans depends on language because language is for the sake of conveying meaning. Turn and twist it around in other directions and you end up with nothing.

A brief summary of the history of hermeneutics was given by Giuseppe di Lampedusa in *The Leopard*:

> *Those were the best days in the life of Tancredi and*
> *Angelica, lives later to be so variegated, so erring,*
> *against the inevitable background of sorrow. But that*
> *they did not know then; and they were pursuing a*
> *future which they deemed more concrete than it*
> *turned out to be, made of nothing but smoke and wind.*

References

Ackrill, J.L., 1963. *Aristotle's* Categories *and* De Interpretatione. Translated with Notes. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

Bhandarkar, R.G., 1913. *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems.* Strassburg: J. Trübner.

Chatterji, K.C., 1957. *Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya: Paspaśāhnika.* Calcutta.

Dalmia, V., 1997. *The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bhāratendu Hariśchandra and Nineteenth-century Banaras.* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Derrida, J., 2002. 'Reste – le maître, ou le supplément d'infini'. *Le Genre Humain* 37 (*Le disciple et ses maîtres – pour Charles Malamoud*), 25–63.

Diels, H., 1903. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutsch*, vols. I–III. Berlin-Grunewald: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Edgerton, F., 1952. *The Bhavadgītā Translated and Interpreted.* Harvard Oriental Series, vols. 38–9. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Gadamer, H-G., 1965. *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer phiosophischen Hermeneutik*, second Auflage. Tüningen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Geach, P., 1972. *Logic Matters.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Gerow, E., 1968. 'Renou's place in vedic exegetical tradition'. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 88(2), 310–33.

Grice, P., 1989. *Studies in the Way of Words.* Cambridge, Massachussets and London, England: Harvard University Press.

Harbsmeier, C., 1998. 'Language and logic'. In: Needham, J. (Ed.), *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. VII: 1. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Heesterman, J.C., 1989. 'The Hindu frontier'. *Itinerario* 13(1), 1–15.

Heidegger, M., 1927. *Sein und Zeit.* Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

Heidegger, M., 1950. *Holzwege.* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Kneale, W., Kneale, M., 1962. *The Development of Logic*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

Lorenzen, D.N., 1999. 'Who invented Hinduism?' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, 630–59.

Murti, T.R.V., 1963. 'Some Thoughts on the Indian Philosophy Of Language'. *Indian Philosophical Congress. Presidential Address.* Varanasi: Lakshmi Das at the Banaras Hindu University.

Oaks, J.A., 2007. 'Medieval Arabic algebra as an artificial language'. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 35(5–6), 543–75.

Renou, L., 1941–42. 'Les connexions entre le rituel et la grammaire en sanskrit'. *Journal Asiatique* 233, 105–165. Reprinted in Staal 1972: 434–69.

Renou, L., 1963. 'Sur le genre du *sūtra* dans la littérature sanskrite'. *Journal Asiatique* 251, 165–216.

Scharfe, H., 1961. *Die Logik im Mahābhāṣya.* Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

Sharma, K., 1987. *Bhakti and the Bhakti Movement. A New Perspective. A Study in the History of Ideas.* Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

Srinivas, M.N., 1952. *Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India.* London and New York: Oxford University Press.

Srinivas, M.N., 1956. 'A note on sanskritization and westernization'. *Far Eastern Quarterly* 15(4), 481–96.

Staal, F., 1961. 'The theory of definition in Indian logic'. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 81, 122–226. Reprinted in Staal 1988: 88–92.

Staal, F., 1963a. 'Sanskrit and sanskritization'. *Journal of Asian Studies* 22, 261–275. Reprinted in: Harrison, J.A., ed. 1972. *South and Southeast Asia: Enduring Scholarship.* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 213–27.

Staal, F., 1963b. Review of Scharfe 1961. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 83, 252–256. Reprinted in Staal 1988: 238–42.

Staal, F., 1967. 'Review of Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer phiosophischen Hermeneutik*'. *Foundations of Language* 3, 203–5.

Staal, F. (Ed.), 1972. *A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians.* Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press.

Staal, F., 1988. *Universals. Studies in Indian logic and Linguistics.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Staal, F., 1990. *Rules Without Meaning. Ritual, Mantras and the Human Sciences.* New York etc: Peter Lang. Reprinted in 1993 and by Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.

Staal, F., 2002. 'Sūtra'. In: Vatsyayan, K. (Ed.), *Kalātattvakośa: A Lexicon of Fundamental Concepts of the Indian Arts*, vol. II: Concepts of Space and Time edited by Bettina Bäumer, pp. 303–14.

Staal, F., 2004. 'From *prāṅmukham* to *sarvatomukham*. A thread through the Śrauta Maze'. In: Griffiths, A., Houben, J.E.M. (Eds.), *The Vedas: Texts, Language and Ritual.* Proceedings of the Third International Workshop. Leiden 2002, pp. 521–55. Groningen: Egbert Forsten.

Staal, F., 2006. 'Artificial languages across sciences and civilizations'. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 34(1–2), 89–141.

Staal, F., 2007. 'Artificial languages between innate faculties'. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 35(5–6), 577–96.

Staal, F., 2008. *Discovering the Vedas. Origins, Mantras, Rituals, Insights.* New Delhi: Penguin India.

Tarski, A., 1935. 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen'. *Studia Philosophica* 1, 261–405.

Thompson, G., 2008. *The Bhagavad Gītā. A New Translation.* New York: North Point Press.